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to be one of complexity merely. "In insects, despite the multiplicity of sensations, associations between sensations remain comparatively few and simple. On the other hand, the cerebral cortex of the higher vertebrates allows of the formation of numerous and complex associations, often composed of elements which are not themselves simple. . . . Intelligence results from the interactions among these associations." In the third part of the book there are brief discussions of the various experimental methods for investigating the intelligence of vertebrates, the largest amount of space being devoted to the method of Pawlow, which is based on the power of stimuli associated with food to evoke a flow of saliva.

In this book, as in his earlier writings, Bohn is guilty of the inconsistency which is characteristic of his school: he uses terms that have always carried a subjective implication, such as sensation, association, and psychism, while insisting that he means by them merely certain objective facts of behavior. If one holds to the view, quite erroneous in the reviewer's opinion, that we can know nothing about the inner aspect of behavior in animals, one should use in describing this behavior words that do not suggest the existence of such knowledge.

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Riddles of the Sphinx, A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism. By F. C. S. SCHILLER. New and Revised Edition. London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim., 1910.—pp. xxvii, 478.

This book was originally published anonymously in 1891; and a second edition was published under the author's name in 1894. Since the latter date the author has been engaged in defending and propagating his "humanistic" version of pragmatism. The speculative metaphysics of the *Riddles*, has thus stood outside the main current of his thought, and is now re-published with some misgivings. "The discovery in philosophic method, which is generally called Pragmatism, but more truly and significantly Humanism, has rendered more or less out of date every earlier work in metaphysics." Hence the author is "bound to confess that if he were now free to handle the whole subject afresh, the result would not be identical with the contents of this book" (Preface, pp. v, x). A sentence in the original edition to the effect that "a philosophical system . . . will be ratified by the way it works and stands the test of experience," nevertheless "sufficiently attests the continuity of his original views with his present Humanism" (p. 169).

The principal changes in the present edition are as follows: (1) the addition of occasional notes bringing the illustrations of scientific procedure up to date; (2) the addition to Chapter III, on Scepticism, of two new sections, dealing with current theories of truth; (3) the revision of Chapter V, on "Reconstruction," to harmonize with the Humanist theory; the addition, as an appendix, of a discussion of "Free Will and Necessity"; the re-printing as appendices of an article on "Choice," and an address on "Science and Religion"; the addition of an index; the alteration of the sub-title, from "A

Study in the Philosophy of Evolution," to "A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism."

The present volume emphasizes two general characteristics of Schiller's philosophy. In the first place, he writes himself down among the apostles of a metaphysical spiritualism or activism. He belongs, in other words, to the school of Bergson, Eucken, Dilthey, Lipps, LeRoy and Papini, rather than to the school of James and Dewey. Both of the last writers show a pronounced trend toward realism, or toward a limited epistemological application of pragmatism. The continental movement, on the other hand, tends to mingle with the tide of voluntaristic and romantic idealism. Schiller is flatly at variance with James's logical realism, in his contention that "every 'logical process' is really a psychological one" (p. 225); his opposition to the positivistic or naturalistic temper of Dewey's mind is illustrated by his declaration that "no apology should be needed for the romance of philosophy in an age which has learned rightly to appreciate 'the fairy tales of science,'" the latter being "superstitions none the less fictitious for being poetical" (p. ix); his metaphysical voluntarism is revealed in his reduction of matter to force, his identification of force with will or conscious effort, and his contention that a "Divine Force," so construed, is the underlying ground of nature (Chapter IX, §§ 17 sq.).

In the second place, the present edition shows an inclination to adopt that syncretistic version of metaphysics that is so popular with contemporary German idealists of romantic proclivities. He now accepts his earlier metaphysics in a somewhat detached and impersonal manner. He 'admires the enterprise,' and 'marvels at its audacity.' He 'now wholly disbelieves in the possibility of framing a system that can convince, or even please, everybody, or lay claim to absolute truth and certainty.' "Practically, . . . a system of metaphysics with whatever pretensions to pure thought and absolute rationality it may start, is always in the end one man's personal vision about the universe, and the 'metaphysical craving,' often so strong in the young, is nothing but the desire to tell the universe what one thinks about it" (p. vii). This sounds very much like disillusionment. And it may not be out of place to remark that the discrediting of philosophical faith reflects the bias of middle-age, as truly as that faith itself reflects the bias of youth. Furthermore, it is only through a youthful faith in the possibility of a philosophy that shall convince everybody, that philosophy lives at all. Were all philosophers to yield to this mood of genial cynicism, and admit the relativity and equal validity of all systems, there would be no systems with which even to regale the promiscuous and sympathetic historical imagination.

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Logik. Von CHRISTOPH SIGWART. Vierte, durchgesehene Auflage besorgt von HEINRICH MAIER. Zwei Bände. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1911.—pp. xxiv, 506; viii, 812.

This fourth edition of the notable *Logic* of Sigwart appears as the post-